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The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive 
Approach Missile Defense System 




The United States and Japan are jointly developing and deploying an integrated advanced regional missile 
defense system meant to counter threats from North Korea. North Korea possesses a large and diversified 
arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that could strike Japanese cities and military bases in the event 
of a crisis and cause measurable damage. The missile defense system currently in place provides strong 
kinematic defensive coverage over Japanese territory. However, in general, the offense enjoys a strong cost 
advantage. It is impractical to deploy as many defensive interceptors as there are offensive missiles, which, 
in turn, limits the efficiency of missile defenses. It should be understood that regional missile defenses in the 
Asia-Pacific are neither capable nor expected to provide 100% defense. Rather, their goal is to provide 
sufficient capability to bolster deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to provide enough defense in the initial 
stages of a crisis to protect vital military assets. Additionally, U.S. and Japanese forces apparently also need 
to develop a better command and control architecture to operate the Asia-Pacific regional missile defense 
system. Finally, while the system is meant to defend only against regional threats, China has argued that the 
system might in the future be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs, thereby diluting its strategic deterrent against 
the United States. Maintaining effective defenses against North Korea while reassuring China will be one of 





Japan has invested significant resources into its missile defense plans. Its decision to pursue 
missile defense could be categorized as either a “threat-driven approach” meant to defend against 
missiles that North Korea (or China) might launch against it or as a “structure-driven approach” 
meant to revamp and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and its military interoperability.1 It is 
very difficult to parse and separate these two motives. In the last decade or so, however, the 
“threat” factor from North Korea seems to be the primary driver for Japanese choices. For 
example, in March 2016, the Japanese Defense Ministry announced that its “ground-based 
missile interception system [Patriot Advanced Capability-3] would be permanently deployed at a 
location in Tokyo following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s increasingly frequent 
launches of ballistic missiles.”2 Table 1 below summarizes a timeline of major events that have 
occurred in the course Japan’s pursuit of missile defenses. 
 
The first major realization of a potential missile threat to the Japanese homeland occurred in 
August 1998, when North Korea flight-tested its Taepodong missile. The “Taepodong shock” 
changed the cautious attitude on missile defense that Japan had previously held. The incident 
measurably “altered the Japanese public’s threat perception vis-à-vis Pyongyang, particularly 
because the missile flew over the Japanese mainland.”3 The 1998 North Korean missile test also 
“consolidated a large political support [leading to the passing of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines legislation] not only allowing the government to officially launch a TMD [theater 
missile defense] co-research [project] with the U.S. but also to introduce domestically-produced 
reconnaissance satellites.”4 This reaction from Japanese politicians to the 1998 incident appears 
to have surprised even the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) officers. Some of 
them had observed that “Such quick political decisions would have been virtually impossible had 
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the Taepodong incident not taken place—we are even ‘grateful’ to Pyongyang for ‘helping’ our 
cause to move on ahead with missile defense.”5  
 
Over the years, North Korea has conducted many test launches of its missile and satellite launch 
vehicles and has not shied from issuing threats towards Japan. In 2013, for example, the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA) of North Korea issued a commentary that said: “Japan is always 
in the cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes the slightest move, the spark of 
war will touch Japan first.”6 North Korea has approximately 1,000 missiles capable of reaching 
regional targets.7 The most numerous missiles are the various SCUDs that can target South 
Korea. From the Japanese perspective, the Nodong missiles with their 1,500 km range are the 
most worrisome. North Korea also seems to possess a limited number of the Musudan missile 
with a range of 3,500 km which puts all of Northeast Asia and Guam and Okinawa under threat.  
 
It should also be noted that North Korea could have as many as 20 nuclear weapons by the end 
of 2016, according to some analysts.8 North Korean motives for procuring a missile arsenal is 
usually attributed to two reasons: “first is to compel the United States to alter its strategic 
calculus so that it is willing to accept a political settlement on the Korean peninsula conducive to 
regime interests…second is to be prepared to defend its interests in case of renewed military 
action on the peninsula, including ensuring survival of the regime.”9  
 
The first section of this paper will examine the status of the North Korean missile arsenal and its 
potential to threaten forward-deployed U.S., Japanese, and other allied forces. The second 
section of this paper will assess the state of readiness of the Asian Phased Adaptive Approach 
(APAA) missile defense system that Japan and the U.S. are establishing and its ability to offer 
limited defense against North Korean missiles. The section will also highlight the various 
command and control (C2) challenges the APAA missile defense system has faced until now. 
The third section will examine potential obstacles to the APAA, including Chinese concerns 
regarding the program. The final section will conclude with a recommendation on managing the 




September 1986 Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoba 
issues public statement on Japan’s 
participation in SDI 
1989 U.S. DoD/SDIO initiates WESTPAC Study. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries wins contract to 
lead study 
1991 Japan decides to acquire PAC-2 systems. 
Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces began 
receiving these PAC-2 systems in 1998. 
1993 North Korea fires four short-range missiles 
into the Sea of Japan 
October 1993 SecDef Les Aspin offers Japan formal 
participation in TMD 
December 1993 U.S.-Japan bilateral Theater Missile Defense 
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Working Group (TMDWG) formed. 
TDMWG is seen as the foundation work that 
has now led to the joint development of SM-3 
IIA 
1995 Japanese government sets aside 20 million 
yen for TMD research. The Office of Ballistic 
Missile Defense Research (BMDR) 
established in the Japanese Defense Agency 
(JDA). 
March 1996 China fires four DF-15 missiles in the vicinity 
of Taiwan 
August 31, 1998 North Korea launches a Taepodong missile 
that flies over Japanese mainland 
September 1998 Both Houses of Japan’s Diet passes an 
unanimous resolution condemning North 
Korean missile launch and urges Japan to 
explore all means to secure the safety of the 
population. 
August 16, 1999 U.S. and Japan sign MOU on joint R&D of 
SM-3 IIA missiles 
2003 Japan decided to deploy the SM-3 Block IA 
on-board its Aegis-equipped ships.  
December 19, 2003 Japan announces decision to deploy a missile 
defense system by acquiring PAC-3 and 
Aegis SM-3 IA 
May 2006 The United States deploys a forward-based X-
band radar at the JASDF’s Shariki Garrison  
2007 First battery of PAC-3 interceptors deployed 
to Iruma Air Base 
2010 Japan decides to increase the number of 
Aegis-equipped BMD ships to six 
December 2014 Second U.S. X-band radar deployed to 
Kyogamisaki 
March 2016 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 to be 
permanently deployed in Tokyo 
Table 1: Timeline on Japanese Missile Defense10 
 
 
North Korea’s Missile Arsenal and the Threat to Japan 
 
Pyongyang’s missile arsenal has progressively grown in both quantity and quality. In the 2000s, 
it was believed that North Korea had several hundred of missiles capable of reaching a wide 
range of locations in the Asia-Pacific.11 In 2002, General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of 
United States Forces Korea testified before the U.S. Congress that North Korea had over 500 
SCUD missile variants.12 A 2009 report by the International Crisis Group suggested that North 
Korea had deployed over 600 SCUDs and around 320 Nodong missiles.13 The 2010 United 
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States Forces Korea Strategic Digest states that North Korea, “with as many as 800 missiles in 
its active inventory…intends to increase its offensive capabilities.”14 Finally, very recent 
estimates by the U.S. Air Force have suggested that North Korea could have a total 1,000 
missiles with around 100 SCUD launchers and 50 Nodong launchers.15 While it is very difficult 
to obtain an accurate count of North Korean missiles, it is, however, possible to develop a rough 
estimate based on various publicly available sources. Table 2 below summarizes an estimate of 
the North Korean missile inventory collated from multiple sources.16 It is should be noted that 
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Table 2: North Korean Missile Specifications17 
 
While North Korea has an ambitious missile development program, its various missile 
capabilities are not equal. For example, its ability to successfully use an intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) or even an intermediate-range ballistic missile (range between 3,000 and 5,500 
kilometers) is highly questionable, although recent successful space launches revive such 
concerns.18 The 2013 U.S. Defense Department Annual Report on North Korea, for example, 
states: “…they [North Korea] unveiled an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a 
version of the NoDong medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a cone-cylinder-flare 
payload at parades during the last three years. To date, the IRBM, like the new mobile ICBM, 
has not been flight-tested and its current reliability as a weapon system would be low.” The 
report also says: “…a space launch does not test a reentry vehicle (RV). Without an RV capable 
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However, North Korea’s shorter range missiles, including various types of SCUDs and some 
Nodong missiles are more tested and presumed to have a higher likelihood of operational 
effectiveness. Figure 1 below shows the reach of these shorter range missiles. One of the largest 
worries for the U.S.-Japan-South Korean alliance is the concerns regarding the North’s potential 
ability to use these missiles coupled with a nuclear weapon. The South Korean 2014 Defense 
White Paper, for example, speculates that “North Korea possesses about 40 kg of plutonium that 
can be used to produce nuclear weapons and it also assessed that a highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) program is underway. North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons also seems to 
hav e reached a considerable level.”20 North Korea is also feared to have an arsenal of biological 
and chemical weaponry that could be delivered using its missiles. Its chemical weapons stockpile 
was estimated in 2005 to be between 2,500 and 5,000 tons.21 Finally, even with mildly inaccurate 
conventional warheads, North Korean missiles could, in principle, substantially disrupt U.S. and 
allied military operations and impede logistics at U.S. bases in the region. 
       
 
Figure 1: Notional Range of North Korean Missiles 
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
 
Japan’s Missile Defense Capacity and Capabilities 
 
While a large proportion of Japanese missile defense infrastructure is relatively new, Japan has 
been involved in missile defense related research and development since the mid-1980s. Under a 
1985 licensing agreement with the United States, Japan produced Patriot missiles.22 In 1998, the 
Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) received a total of 24 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 
(PAC-2) batteries. In 1999, Japan decided to upgrade to the PAC-3 missile defense system at a 
cost of $1.7-$2.3 billion.23 In 2007, the first battery of PAC-3 interceptors was deployed to Iruma 
Air Base near Tokyo.24 The JASDF now possesses a total of 16 PAC-3 fire units located at Naha, 
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Kasuga, Gifu, and Iruma.25 It should be noted that these PAC-3 batteries provide only terminal 
defense with very limited coverage. 
 
A national missile defense shield for Japan is provided by its Aegis-equipped ships armed with 
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor.26 In 2003, Japan decided to deploy the SM-
3 Block IA on-board its Aegis-equipped ships.27 In December 2005, the Japanese Cabinet and 
Security Council approved the joint development with the United States of the SM-3 Block IIA 
interceptor.28 Tokyo might, eventually, also deploy an Aegis-Ashore SM-3 Block IIA system in 
mainland Japan similar to the system currently being deployed in Europe.29 Japan tested the SM-
3 Block IA missiles for the first time in 2007. An aegis-equipped Japanese warship, the JS 
Kongo, was used to track and intercept a mock target missile.30 Presently Japanese Navy 
operates four Kongo class Aegis-equipped ships: Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishma.31  
 
In 2010, Japan decided to increase the number of Aegis-equipped BMD ships to six along with 
“four newly developed ground-based X-band radar sets (FPS-5), upgrades of seven radar 
systems (upgraded FPS-3), and modification of the Japan Air-Defense Ground Environment 
(JADGE), an automated integrated air-defense system.”32 To support Japan’s missile defense 
mission, the United States has deployed, among other things, a PAC-3 battalion at Okinawa. The 
United States has also deployed a forward-based X-band radar at the JASDF’s Shariki Garrison 
in May 2006.33 A second X-band radar was deployed to Kyogamisaki in December 2014.34 The 
United States presently deploys five Aegis-equipped missile defense-capable destroyers in Japan. 
In 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that “in response to 
Pyongyang’s pattern of provocative and destabilizing actions…I can announce today that the 
United States is planning to forward-deploy two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense ships 
to Japan by 2017.”35 
 
In light of all these investments, are current missile defense deployments sufficient in tracking 
and destroying North Korean missiles?36 What sort of coordinated attack scenarios can the 
missile defenses hold up against? The discussion below will illustrate that the Asian Phased 
Adaptive Approach missile defense system fares quite well on the former, but poorly on the 
latter. Figure 2 below illustrates the defensive footprint (based on kinematic reach37) of an Aegis-
equipped Japanese naval vessel with SM-3 Block IA interceptors.38 The nominal footprint shown 
in the figure indicates that the SM-3 Block IA interceptors do provide good coverage over Japan, 
with some parts remaining exposed. 
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Figure 2: Nominal Defense Footprint of a Aegis-equipped Japanese ship loaded with SM-3 IA 
stationed in the Sea of Japan. The nominal footprint represents only the kinematic reach of the 
interceptor.  
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
However, a good footprint alone is not sufficient to execute missile defense missions. It should 
be understood that missile defense cannot provide a 100% guaranteed defense against every 
incoming missile. Rather, missile defenses are expected to intercept a significant fraction of an 
early salvo of missiles, thereby giving U.S. or Japanese forces sufficient time to respond. The 
presence of Japan’s missile defense systems will not completely eliminate the missile threat that 
U.S. or Japanese forces may face from North Korea. Specifically, a single Aegis-equipped 
Japanese ship could, in theory, have as many as 90 interceptors dedicated to missile defense.  
 
In operational reality, however, the numbers might be much lower.39 Figure 3 below shows the 
leakage rate (the number of missiles that pass through the missile defense shield) for a given 
missile defense system. If one interceptor is committed for every missile, then to obtain a 
leakage rate of 10% (i.e., 1 in 10 missiles leak through), the SM-3 Block IA interceptors have to 
possess a 90% probability of kill. A 90% probability of kill is an extremely optimistic value to 
expect. If the SM-3 Block IA interceptors possess a reduced probability of kill of 70%, then to 
maintain the 10% leakage rate would require two interceptors per incoming target missile. In that 
case, a Japanese Aegis-equipped naval vessel with 60 SM-3 Block IA interceptors (the rest of the 
missile load in the ship can be presumed to be dedicated to other functions like air-to-air  
defense, anti-submarine warfare or cruise missiles, etc.40) would be able to able to defend against 
only 30 North Korean missiles under optimistic conditions. North Korea, on the other hand, is 
believed to possess 250-300 Nodong missiles that could conceivably be launched in a short time 
window.41 The current inventory of four Japanese naval vessels would only be able to provide 
limited protection to critical civilian and/or military assets, particularly so if some of the ships 
are held back for later operations. A large North Korean attack salvo of around one hundred 
missiles could cause substantial damage to alliance forces or civilian populations. Nevertheless, 
the Aegis-equipped ships with SM-3 Block IAs along with the Patriot systems could offer a 
North Korean 
Launch Location 
Aegis BMD Ship 
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Figure 3: Leakage Rate of a Single Layer Missile Defense System 
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
 
Command and Control Challenges 
While the disparity between the available number of missile defense interceptors in Japan’s 
possession and offensive missiles in North Korea’s arsenal is a cause for concern, equally 
worrisome is the performance of missile defense systems to date. There have been significant 
lapses in the command and control procedures of the system in the past when it was called upon 
to establish a shield over Japan. 
 
For the past decade, Japan has been grappling with the process of establishing command and 
control procedures for defense in the event of a sudden missile attack. Beginning in July 2005, 
Japan amended its Self-Defense Forces Law to establish procedures that pre-delegated 
interceptor launch authority to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the event of a rocket launch 
by North Korea if it overflew Japanese territory.42 This amendment permitted Japan’s “defense 
minister to issue an order—in accordance with procedures approved by the Prime Minister—to 
destroy an incoming object so as to prevent the loss of lives or damage to property on Japanese 
territory.”43 In October 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a 
document titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” that 
included provisions for bilateral and joint operational coordination.44 As part of this initiative, 
the JASDF Air Defense Headquarters was relocated to Yokota Air Base where the United States 
Forces Japan (USFJ) is based.45 This relocation was intended to foster greater data sharing and 
integrated decision making between U.S. and Japanese forces in the event of a missile attack. In 
2007, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces established the Joint Staff Office (JSO) to better coordinate 
operational requirements of missile defense. This action was motivated by the realization that 
“Joint [military] operations is also an essential foundation for effective BMD, because the 
MSDF’s [Maritime Self-Defense Forces] Aegis vessels and the ASDF’s warning and 
N=Total number of interceptors 
W=Total number of apparent warheads (i.e. both warheads and 
decoys classified as warheads) 
W1=Total number of apparent warheads that leaks through the 
single layer defense 
P=probability of a single interceptor killing one apparent warhead 
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surveillance systems and Patriot missile defense systems are all part of the Japanese BMD 
system, and these assets should be closely coordinated for time-sensitive missile defense 
operations.”46 
 
While all these actions cumulatively showcase a desire from the Japanese and U.S. forward-
deployed forces to master the command and control cycle involved in missile defense 
interceptions, the real-world results have been less successful. In four instances to date, Japan 
and the United States have had an opportunity to demonstrate the system. In three instances 
(2006, 2009, and 2012), significant problems of command and control were uncovered.   
 
In the 2006 instance:47 
Despite the U.S. forces informing the SDF of the third missile launch on July 5 at 
4:59 a.m. and the MSDF Aegis destroyer [Kongo] being dispatched to the Sea of 
Japan, Kongo’s radar failed to detect any trace of ballistic missiles. Taepodong-2 was 
estimated to have a height of 1,000 km, which, theoretically, was supposed to be 
visible on Kongo’s radar after the launch, but because the missile never attained the 
necessary height or distance to be properly detected, it took some time for Japan to 
confirm that the third missile was indeed a Taepodong…and confused JDA officials 
kept asking each other, ‘Was the launch a failure, or what?’ It is speculated that the 
six other missiles had been Nodongs or Scuds, and Kongo’s radar detected 
trajectories of half of those missiles…Some defense officials speculated that the 
reason why Kongo was unable to detect the missiles was because the U.S. 
government did not relay all of their information to the Japanese Aegis, subsequently 
fueling the suspicion that ‘the U.S. does not trust us well enough.’48 
 
In the 2009 instance:49 
On 4 April [2009] at 12:16, the FPS-5 phased-array radar at Iioka, Chiba Perfecture, 
detected an object above the Sea of Japan. This information was sent to staff at Air 
Defense Headquarters, Fuchu, Tokyo. In accordance with procedure, the staff 
reported verbally to other headquarters staff, using the phrases “Iioka detected” and 
‘SEW [Shared Early Warning] detected’. However, there was a misunderstanding. 
At that time, SEW had not detected the missile launch. The voice-based information 
was immediately disseminated to the local government through the Cabinet 
Secretariat. Once minute later, the Joint Staff Office checked SEW information and 
noticed that SEW had not detected the missile launch. Accordingly, they reported 
that the 12:16 launch information was false. Finally, at 12:20, the corrected 
information—stating that no missile had been detected—was disseminated to the 
local government. According to the after-action report of 2009, the human error 
happened because one staff had been wrongly convinced that both FPS-5 and SEW 
had detected the missile launch.  
 
In contrast, the situation was reversed in April 2012:50 
On 13 April at 7:40 am, the MoD received SEW information from the US. However, 
it took time for other sensors to confirm the launch, to double check, and no Japanese 
sensors could detect it. For that reason, the GoJ’s [Government of Japan] 
announcement of the missile launch was delayed for about one hour. Finally at 8:23, 
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Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka announced the information at a press briefing, 
followed by a briefing by Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura at 8:37. The 
reason for this delay was that the GoJ had established a double-check principle to 
avoid the dissemination of false information, as had happened in 2009. In addition, 
in April 2012, North Korea’s missile exploded immediately after the launch. In 
general, radar cannot pick up objects below the horizon…therefore, both the ground-
based radar in Japan and the maritime-based radar of the Aegis vessel deployed in 
the Southern part of Japan could not detect the missile because it crashed before it 
rose above their horizon. This physical reality prevented the double-checking of the 
information released by the SEW space-based sensors. 
 
Since then, the performances of the missile defense units have been tested twice. In December 
2012, when North Korea launched a space launch vehicle, Japan was able to successfully 
disseminate early warning information to its local governments and between various missile 
defense military units quickly.51 Most recently, in anticipation of the February 7, 2016, launch of 
North Korea’s satellite launch vehicle, the Japanese Defense Minister, Gen. Nakatani, ordered 
Aegis-equipped missile defense warships and its PAC-3 missile defense units to, if needed, 
destroy components falling within its territory.52 The report on the performance of the missile 
defense forces in these instances is still forthcoming. Its judgment would be extremely 
illuminating in understanding the performance of the Japanese missile defense forces. However, 
the various command and control failures highlighted above does force one to question if the 
system will function effectively in the face of a surprise North Korean missile attack. 
 
 
China’s Opposition to U.S. and Japanese Missile Defense Deployments  
 
Chinese opposition to the deployment of missile defense in Northeast Asia by Japan and the 
United States falls under one of these reasons:53 “(1) TMD cooperation with the United States 
would mark a qualitative upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance; (2) Provision of TMD-related 
missile technologies—such as propulsion and guidance—could contribute to a Japanese 
offensive ballistic missile program; (3) TMD cooperation with Japan could provide the technical 
and political basis for Japanese “remilitarization.” Japan will first develop missile defenses (a 
‘shield’) and then may develop offensive missile forces (a ‘spear’); (4) Japanese deployment of 
upper-tier TMD could be used to defend Taiwan;54 (5) TMD development may spark an arms 
race in Asia between China and Japan and consequently between Taiwan and China; (6) TMD 
and National Missile Defense (NMD) are closely related, so Japanese participation in joint 
development of TMD will ultimately assist the United States in the development of NMD; and 
(7) ‘US-Japan cooperation on TMD will aggravate tensions on the Korean peninsula’ and ‘the 
nuclear and missile-related problems with Korea can only be settled by political means through 
dialogue.’” 
 
Beijing has had an innate suspicion regarding U.S. missile defense deployments and U.S. 
intentions in East Asia. A recent Chinese military text, The Science of Military Strategy, has, for 
example, asserted that U.S. missile defense in Asia is “creating increasingly serious effects on 
the reliability and effectiveness of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear attack.”55 Chinese personnel 
argue that missile defense deployments in their neighborhood would fundamentally alter the 
	
 
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 3  11	
strategic balance and stability between the United States and China and, in turn, would force 
China to increase its nuclear arsenal. China (and Russia) has consistently argued that any missile 
threats from North Korea are a pretext to deploy missile defenses targeting them.56 They contend 
instead that “political, legal and diplomatic means, to explore the possibility of gradually 
working out a global control system in prevention of the proliferation of missiles and related 
technologies, and to conduct extensive and non-discriminatory dialogue and cooperation” is the 
way to address such threats.57 
 
Although Washington is undertaking a missile defense plan that it clearly states is driven by 
legitimate U.S. and allies’ security considerations, China (and Russia) apparently have found it 
difficult to accept this U.S. articulation. Additionally, the United States has repeatedly pointed 
out that these systems do not and are not meant to alter strategic stability. For example, the 
recent U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated: “Engaging China in discussions of U.S. 
missile defense plans is also an important part of our international efforts…maintaining strategic 
stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as important to the administration as maintaining 
strategic stability with other major powers.”58 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also made 
similar commitments.59 Conceivably, however, “in dealing with the US, prudent states are 
necessarily going to assume that its intentions are at best ambiguous, and more likely 
adversarial.”60 China (and Russia) tends to argue that even limited U.S. missile defense postures 
will over time accumulate increasing capabilities, and can therefore quickly convert such 
capability to a larger threatening posture.61 Such logic can be observed directly in Chinese stated 
opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defense radars in the region. Wu Riqiang from 
China’s Renmin University, for example, suggests that “Beijing’s biggest concern is that such 
[missile defense] radars will be deployed close enough to China to register the decoy-
deployment process of strategic missiles…this prevents missile defense systems from being 
susceptible to mid-course decoy countermeasures, and should be seen as China’s red line.”62  
 
Of course, in theory, U.S. missile defense systems in the Asia-Pacific could be reconfigured to 
offer limited defenses against Chinese short- and medium-range missiles. And, while North 
Korean missile threats permeate the discourse on Japanese missile defense, it is not 
inconceivable for it to maintain the potential to ramp capabilities against China if a significant 
threat perception arises.63 Japan’s ambassador Imai Ryuichi, for example, said: “…with all the 
debate and trouble TMD has caused in the SDF, it would be foolish to think that Japan spends 
enormous amounts of money to only defend against two or three North Korean Taepo Dongs.”64 
However, such a reconfiguration would be of limited effectiveness given that China’s deployed 
missile arsenal is one of the most extensive in the world.65 China continues to modernize its 
missile arsenal and is also developing a number of newer and more capable offensive missiles.66 
China is believed to have around 1,200 short-range missiles. Its medium range-missile inventory 
could include as many as 400 CSS-6 missiles (with a range of 600 km) and around 85 CSS-5 
missiles (with a range of 1,750 km).67 China also possesses a significant number of other 
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.68 These missiles could be targeted against 
U.S. forward-deployed forces, allied forces, and bases in the region.69 Succinctly capturing this 
aspect of the tensions between the United States and China on missile defense, former U.S. 
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I share the Chinese concern over the deleterious effect of an arms race in the region, 
but I believe that if an arms race does get underway it will have been stimulated by 
the extensive deployment of missiles, not the deployment of missile defenses…I am 
today more pessimistic about the future of United States-China relations than I have 
been for several decades.  
 
Presently, ranges of Chinese conventionally-armed missiles extend to U.S. bases as far away as 
Guam. Any debate on U.S. missile defense reductions in the region should, therefore, also 





Recurrent North Korean provocations have and will continue to shift Japanese preferences on 
missile defense to a more capable system. However, missile defense come with inherent 
limitations that under the best circumstances will provide only limited protection. Also, while the 
need to limit provoking China influences Japanese defense decisions, including the procurement 
and deployment of missile defense equipment, unless there is substantial change in the 
perception of the North Korea threat, it seems that such concerns will play only a secondary role. 
A jointly operated U.S.-Japan defensive system could turn out to be crucial to defend Japan and 
U.S. forward-deployed forces from North Korean threats, and in the larger context, help to 
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